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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06641-84 26 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:

National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT:

The Soviets Grab the Umbrella

1. The Soviets have decided to engage in the umbrella arms control exchange in a remarkable, but not surprising, tactical switch from the stone-wall policies followed with almost uniform consistency since the end of last year. Their aim is no less than to encourage a substantial redirection of the Administration's policies in its second term. Soviet commentaries -- the most recent and comprehensive current example is attached -- lay out for internal audiences why this is worth a try:

The stress on "new talks", not resumption of the old ones, makes it possible to resume negotiations without explicitly repudiating past positions, such as no talks on INF without reversal of US INF deployments.

The world has learned that the "language of force" and "positions of strength" will not force Soviet concessions. Read: Moscow's hanging tough for the past year paid off after all.

President Reagan is being pulled in the opposite directions of "playing the peacemaker" or "returning to the course of confrontation". He currently leans toward the former role.

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
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Washington is in the throes of political battle which will determine the future US line, whose outcome cannot be assured, but which, by implication, ought to be influenced by active Soviet political tactics.

Meanwhile, US allies, domestic opinion, and economic conditions have generated pressure that could modify Administration behavior in the next four years.

Firm Soviet pursuit of "its principled line" has contributed to this pressure and created a potentially new situation. Resumption of talks does not represent a Soviet concession, but response to opportunity -- which will be very cautiously explored.

- 2. There is a certain amount of rationalization in these arguments. They are crafted to reassure skeptics within the Soviet elite, among whom there are surely many, that these talks will not put Moscow on the slippery slope to unnecessary concessions, but offer the chance of coaxing Washington onto it. It is unlikely that these rationalizations will be entirely persuasive. We can expect in coming weeks to see implicit questioning on the part of such skeptics as to who is going to take advantage of whom ("kto kovo", or "who gets whom" as Lenin put it) in these talks and the process that follows.
- 3. Underlying these arguments is the pragmatic recognition that you can't make money at political poker by staying out of every hand. With the President massively reelected and the Soviet bureaucracy convinced, according to many good reports, that the previous policy had run its course, it is now time to rejoin the game.
- 4. It is worth note that a Soviet Politburo evidently beset by vigorous internal politicking over succession has been able to make this tactical adjustment quite handily. It is equally significant that the process of adjustment coincided with the reassertion of Chernenko's political status. This coincidence should not be read as proof of Chernenko's detentist proclivities, at least for the moment. Rather his reemergence damped prospects for an immediate succession and permitted the Politburo to get some other business done. All reporting about his current authority indicates that Gromyko must have had a decisive voice in the Soviet decision.
- 5. The Soviet decision to reengage the Reagan Administration does not represent a fundamental or strategic change of foreign policy line. So far, it is a sensible tactical shift in dealing with a US administration that will be around for another four years and clearly wants its second term marked by better US-Soviet relations or, at least, earnest attempts to get them. The Soviets have certainly heard Bud McFarlane's assurance that the President is committed to getting arms control results before he leaves office. This sets them up for playing hard to get.



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- 6. In the months ahead, we can expect the Soviets to be more active on many fronts to influence the political setting in which the US decides its negotiating positions in new arms control talks and, equally important, the contents of the rest of its national security agenda: military budgets and programs, and policy toward regional security matters such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. With arms control talks once again in prospect or progress, the Soviets expect they will have better prospects to influence this agenda than they did over the past year, or possibly the past four years.
- 7. Playing this game does not require a lot of decisiveness in Moscow given its advantages of secrecy and its ability to pursue several seemingly contradictory tactical lines at once. Chernenko has made plain that the larger objective of the game -- admittedly a long shot, but worth a try -- is to get back to the "experience of the '70s" and to detente as "the natural state" of US-Soviet relations. Such a condition would tend to spare the Soviet leadership the necessity of more fundamental choices in foreign, military, and domestic affairs, or at least to delay the need for fundamental choice. That would be tailor made for this Soviet leadership.

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Attachment: As Stated

Briefer



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PRAYDA ON RESUMPTION OF USSR-U.S. ARMS TALKS

TAKE 1 OF 2 -- PRAYDA ON ARMS TALKS

PM241825 MOSCOW PRAYDA IN RUSSIAN 25 NOV 84 FIRST EDITION P 4

(NIKOLAY PROZHOGIN "INTERNATIONAL REVIEW")

(EXCERPT) TIME FOR CONCRETE DECISIONS

THE OUTGOING WEEK IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE HAS BEEN MARKED BY THE BROAD AND INTERESTED DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS PUT FORWARD BY COMRADE K.U. CHERNENKO IN HIS REPLIES TO QUESTIONS FROM A CORRESPONDENT OF THE AMERICAN TY COMPANY, NBC. THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE ATTRACTED SUCH CLOSE ATTENTION IS LOGICAL, FOR IT IS A MATTER OF THE MOST VITAL QUESTIONS OF THE AGE -- OF HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, FIND A WAY OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE, AND CREATE A SITUATION IN THE WORLD IN WHICH THE PEOPLES DO NOT FEEL FEAR FOR THE FUTURE.

FOR THIS IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THEIR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE, TO AGREE ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMS, PRIMARILY NUCLEAR ARMS, AND ON THE PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF THE ARMS RACE TO AREAS AS YET UNAFFECTED BY IT. THE SOVIET LEADER STRESSED THE PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD PUT FORWARD RECENTLY, POINTING OUT PRACTICAL WAYS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THESE ARE THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FREEZE ON NUCLEAR NEAPONS, AND THE COMPLETION OF HORK ON AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. THESE ARE URGENT AND OBJECTIVELY THE MOST EASILY SOLUABLE QUESTIONS, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THE LIST OF POSSIBLE STEPS IN THE DIRECTION OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD COULD BE LENGTHENED.

THE PEOPLES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION FIRMLY FOLLOWS ITS PRINCIPLED LINE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF TURNS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THIS IS CONFIRMED YET AGAIN BY THE ANTHOLOGY OF SELECTED SPEECHES AND ARTICLES BY COMRADE K.U. CHERNENKO PUBLISHED IN VIENNA THE OTHER DAY.

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TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE '70S, WHICH SHOWED THAT FRUITFUL COOMPERATION BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE BUT NECESSARY. OUR COUNTRY IS CONVINCED THAT DETENTE IS THE NATURAL STATE SINCE CONFRONTATION IS A DANGEROUS ANOMALY WHOSE CONSEQUENCES ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS.

WE ARE NOT TO BLAME FOR THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLES' HOPES FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE SALT-II TREATY WERE DISAPPOINTED. THAT OTHER IMPORTANT TALKS HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF, THAT THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD HAS BEEN DANGEROUSLY EXACERBATED. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THIS IS BORNE BY THOSE CIRCLES IN WASHINGTON WHICH BELIEVED -- AND MANY PEOPLE THERE STILL BELIEVE THIS TO THIS DAY -- THAT, HAVING FORGED AHEAD IN THE ARMS RACE, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO TALK TO THE USSR IN THE LANGUAGE OF "FORCE" AND IMPOSE THEIR "SOLUTIONS." TODAY IT IS NELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE WORLD THAT THIS CANNOT BE. THE SUPPORTERS OF A "POLICY OF STRENGTH" ARE FINDING THEMSELYES INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN THE FACE OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

AN IMPORTANT ROLE IS PLAYED BY THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COMMUNITY COUNTRIES AND THE PEOPLES' BROADENING PEACE STRUGGLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, INCLUDING IN THE UNITED STATES. THESE FACTORS HAVE NOT BEEN UNINFLUENTIAL RECENTLY IN OFFICIAL MASHINGTON CIRCLES' CONSIDERATION THAT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO SOMEWHAT SOFTEN THEIR BELLICOSE TONE. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EVEN BEGUN TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT DURING THE "SECOND PRESIDENTIAL TERM" THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE NO TASK MORE IMPORTANT THAN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. WELL, WE WILL WAIT AND SEF

A REPORT WAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE AGREED TO EMBARK ON NEW TALKS WITH THE AIM OF REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS. TO FORMULATE A JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF SUCH TALKS USSR FOREIGN MINISTER A.A. GROMYKO AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE G. SHULTZ WILL MEET IN GENEVA ON 7-8 JANUARY 1985.

IN THIS LIGHT THE SOVIET UNION'S APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES TO JOIN US IN SEEKING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS ASSUMES INCRERSINGLY TOPICAL SIGNIFICIANCE.

DISCUSSIONS, DISCUSSIONS...

WHEN DISCUSSING THE THEME OF DIRLOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, THE CONCEPT OF "UMBRELLA" TALKS HAS BEEN PUT INTO CIRCULATION IN WASHINGTON, MERNING THAT A BROAD RANGE OF QUESTIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED UNDER SUCH AN "UMBRELLA."

ONE HIGH-RANKING WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL HAS DESCRIBED "UMBRELLA" TALKS AS "AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES DESIGNED

TO PROVIDE BOTTH SIDES WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASCERTAIN TO WHAT EXTENT OUR VIEWS DIFFER ON STABILITY AND HOW EACH OF US SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY WITH THE AID OF ARMS CONTROL." FOR HIS PART, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DIRECTOR K. ADELMAN ADDED THAT THESE WOULD NOT BE "NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SENSE THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ELABORATE TREATY FORMULATIONS OR REACH AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES; THEY WOULD BE A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS."

LET US NOTE, FIRST, THAT BOTH THESE EXPLANATIONS DEAL NOT WITH ARMS REDUCTIONS BUT MERELY "ARMS CONTROL." THE TERMINOLOGY ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON IS NO ACCIDENT, OF COURSE. MOREOVER, THE CITED STATEMENTS ARE NOT DISTINGUISHED BY CLAIRTY IN DEFINING THE U.S. STANCE. THIS LATTER FACT EVIDENTLY REFLECTS THE STRUGGLE WHICH, JUDGING BY U.S. PRESS REPORTS, IS TAKING PLACE DEEP WITHIN THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION ON THE QUESTION OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. "WE ARE BY NO MEANS UNANIMOUS IN OUR POSITION," AN OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMAN ADMITTED A FEW DAYS AGO.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WRITES THAT "A STRUGGLE TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT HAS BEGUN ADMONG HIGH-RANKING AMERICAN OFFICIALS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON ARE GIVING HIM DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED ADVICE ON ALL THE MAIN QUESTIONS RANGING FROM ARMS CONTROL TO CENTRAL AMERICA. THE HAIN SUBJECT OF THE DISPUTES IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER REAGAN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PLAY THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKER DURING HIS SECOND TERM, TRANSLATING HIS PREELECTION RHETRORIC INTO REALITY, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO RETURN TO THE COURSE OF CONFRONTATION WHICH CHARACTRIZED HIS FIRST TERM. HT PRESENT, HS FAR AS CAN BE JUDGED, REAGAN IS INCLINING TOWARD THE COURSE OF ABRADONING CONFRONTATION RECOMMENDED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT... AT THE SAME TIME THE SUPPORTERS OF A HARD LINE ARE CONTINUING BACKSTAGE MOYES TO PREVENT A SOFTENING OF THE U.S. POSITION."

(MORE)

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TRKE 2 OF 2 -- (PRAYDA ON ARMS TALKS)

///THE U.S. POSITION."

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(EXCERPT) THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT WE HAVE SEEN ACROSS THE OCEAN "BATTLES" WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SHOW SOME "PERCEMAKING FIGURE" IN AN EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA LIGHT. THE AMERICAN PRESS IS LAYING IT ON THICK IN DESCRIBING WHAT NBC'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT CALLED "A CLASSIC POWER STRUGGLE," WHOSE MAIN PROTAGONISTS ARE THE HEADS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PENTAGON ON THE OTHER.

THE NOT UNKNOWN AMERICAN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARIST CIRCLES. A FEW DAYS AGO IT PRESENTED THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WITH A REPORT WHOSE CONTENT WAS LEAKED TO THE PRESS. THE REPORT CALLS ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO RENOUNCE THE ABM TREATIES SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR IN 1972 AND NOT TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ANTISATELLITE MEAPONS AND LIKEWISE NOT TO AGREE TO THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND TOTAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND NOT TO RATIFY THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND TESTS OF SUCH WEAPONS. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO THIS SUPERHAMK ORGANIZATION, THE UNITED STATES MUST NOT CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE BANNING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE... IN A WORD, THE REPORT CALLS FOR ALL CHANNELS OF THE ARMS RACE TO BE LEFT OPEN AND FOR IT TO BE CONTINUED IN EVERY WAY IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY SUPREMACY OVER THE SOVIET UNION.

SO, DISCUSSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONFLICTING VIEWS. BUT WHERE IS THERE ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE OR CONCRETE IN ANY OF THIS? NOTHING OF THIS KIND IS AS YET VISIBLE IN WASHINGTON. TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS OR EVEN DISPUTES ARE NOT A BAD THING IF, OF COURSE, THEY GIVE RISE TO THE TRUTH AND AN UNDERSTANDING THAT CONCRETE ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND END THE ARMS RACE. IT HAS LONG BEEN TIME TO ABANDON THE ILLUSIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES, IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, WORDS, "WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO BUILD UP ARMS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PERSUADING OR COMPELLING MOSCOW TO REDUCE THEM." THE AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THIS NEWSPAPER COUNTERS SUCH ILLUSIONS WITH THE VIEW OF "PRACTICALLY ALL AUTHORITATIVE SPECIALISTS ON

Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP86M00886R000800130011-1 SUVIET HEF HIRS WHILL DO EVERYTHING - NECESSARY TO PRESERVE MILITARY PARITY. "YES, THIS IS THE CASE. AND HERE EVEN THE INSANE "STAR NARS" CONCEPT, THE SHIFTING OF THE ARMS RACE TO SPACE, WILL NOT HELP.

BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE GIVES ASSURANCES THAT REAGAN HAS EVERY INTENTION "OF CROWNING HIS PRESIDENCY WITH AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT." THIS INTENTION OS HIS IS "SOLID AS STEEL;" WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF M. DERVER STATED. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE VIEW OF MOST AMERICAN OBSERVERS, THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS IS THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAM PROCLAIMED IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER, THERE IS AS YET NO INTENTION TO ABANDON THIS SINCE BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE PENTAGON SEE THIS PLAN, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS, AS A MEANS FOR SECURING AMERICA'S "INVULNERABILITY" AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AS "AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRESSURING THE USSR."

IN THIS CONNECTION, WASHINGTON POST OBSERVER S. ROSENFELT NOTES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ADHERENCE TO THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAM IN NO WAY TALLIES WITH THE PROCLAIMED ASPIRATION TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN TALKS WITH THE USSR.

CONCERN IN ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE WASHINGTON TO EMBARK ON TALKS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE. THIS QUESTION OCCUPIED AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE COURSE OF THE JUST-ENDED VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTER C. CHEYSSON. FRG FEDERAL CHANCELLOR H. KOHL INTENDS TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF "REAL RESULTS" IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN WASHINGTON. JAPANESE PREMIER Y. NAKASONE HAS ALSO VOICED HIS INTENTION "TO MAKE EFFORTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING PEACE" DURING HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH THE U.S. PRESIDENT.

NO MATTER HOW POLITE THE FORMULATIONS USED BY THESE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THEIR APPEALS TO WASHINGTON, THEY DISPLAY APPRECIABLE CONCERN, PRIMARILY WITH THE U.S. ASPIRATION TO SHIFT THE ARMS RACE INTO SPACE. WHICH THREATS TO JEOPARDIZE EVEN THE MILITARY CONCEPTS ADOPTED NOW BY THEIR ALLIES, NOT TO MENTION THE THREAT POSED BY SUCH PLANS FOR THE CAUSE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

IN ADDITION TO THE GROWING THREAT OF WAR, MANY PEOPLE IN THE WEST ARE ALSO CONCERNED BY THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE. THE LATEST DOWN-TURN IN THE U.S. ECONOMY IS CAUSING INCREASINGLY SERIOUS CONCERN AMONG AMERICAN BUSINESS CIRCLES. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT IT IS AT PRECISELY THIS TIME THAT THE ORGAN OF THESE CIRCLES, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE UNDER THE EXPRESSIVE HEADLINE "THE ARMS BUILDUP PLANNED BY REAGAN COULD BE BEYOND THE UNITED STATES." THUS, THE INTOXICATION WITH MILITARY PROGRAMS IS BEING FOLLOWED BY AN INEVITABLE HANGOVER.

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE HAVE ALSO RFFECTED THE POSITION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, WHO ARE CONVINCED, AS THE JOURNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS STATES, THAT "PEACE IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF NORKERS' LIVING CONDITIONS." "WE ARE WITNESSING A TRANSITION TO THE PEACE STRUGGLE THROUGHOUT DUR SOCIETY, AND THE LABOR UNION MOVEMENT CANNOT BE AN EXCEPTION," THIS JOURNAL TESTIFIES. "ON MANY FRONTS -- IN THE STRUGGLE GAINST THE MX MISSILES, THE CAMPAIGN FOR A NUCLEAR FREEZE, THE GROWING DPPOSITION TO ARMS EXPENDITURE, AND THE INDIGNATION AT MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS -- THE LABOR UNIONS ARE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE."

THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON WHICH THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE AGREED TO EMBARK WILL BEGIN IN THE NEW YEAR. THE PEOPLES EXPECT THEM TO BE JUST THAT -- NEW TALKS IN WHICH THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL FINALLY BE PREPARED TO HEED THE REPLICIES OF THE MODERN WORLD AND THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND IDENTICAL SECURITY IN ORDER TO REACH ACCORDS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE.

(ENDALL)

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DDI - 06212/84 ACIS - 704/84 31 October 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Intelligence	だ。 (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4
FROM:	Unier, Arms Control Intelligence Staff	25X1
	Dr. Lawrence Gershwin National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs	
SUBJECT:	US-USSR "Umbrella" Talks	25X1
1. This "f Gershwin earlier	ast-track" memorandum responds to a request you gave to Dr.	25X1
been discussed in our last meeting (I believe) spec	the US-USSR "umbrella" talks has been extremely limited in anch so far. Although the concept of the "umbrella" talks has n the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (for example, during), no formal tasking has been issued. In fact, Mr. McFarlane ifically said that work on the "umbrella" talks should not ing had been issued.	25x1
Jog III allori dask	mg nad been 135ucu.	25X1
refer to the "uml to these meetings Soviet Union. The combining the STA strategic arms pr	appears to be a different context, ACDA has conducted in the a series of meetings for Director Adelman which ACDA officers brella" talks. Dr. Gershwin, Fritz Ermarth and I were invited s. I was able to attend the first, which dealt with the he second dealt with the advantages and disadvantages of ART and INF negotiations. The third dealt with selling US rograms to the Congress. The next meeting now set for er, will deal with public diplomacy.	25X1
4. We hope assist you on th	this overview is helpful. If there is more we can do to is subject, please call and let us know.	25X1
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